For a discrete or a continuous source model, we study the problem of key distillation with one round rate-limited public communication between two legitimate users. Although, we do not derive new bounds on the wiretap secret-key (WSK) capacity for the discrete source model, we study an alternative achievability scheme that may be useful for practical application such as quantum key distribution (QKD) or physical-layer security, and that conveniently extends known bounds to the case of a continuous source model. Specifically, we consider a sequential key-distillation strategy, that implements a ratelimited reconciliation step to handle reliability, followed by a privacy amplification step performed with extractors to handle secrecy. We prove that such a sequential strategy leads to an optimal key-distillation (under the assumption of degraded sources in the case of two-way communication). Furthermore, we study under which conditions secrecy and reliability can be treated as independent problems. Finally, in the case of one-way rate-limited public communication, we illustrate our results for a binary and a Gaussian degraded source model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-theoretic secret-key agreement protocols [1] , [2] draw their strength from a security relying on information-theoretic metrics rather than on complexity theory, thereby avoiding the assumption of bandwidth resources, such as in wireless sensor networks). Note that the achievability scheme of [14, Theorem 4.1], which only holds for Gaussians sources and when there is no side information at the eavesdropper, is very close to the sequential approach that we study, even though their model is different in that it deals with a quantized source and unrestricted public communication. Although, we do not improve WSK capacity bounds for the discrete source model, we provide an achievability scheme that might be easier to translate into practical designs. The main contributions of this work are:
• an alternative achievability scheme that separates reliability and secrecy by means of a reconciliation protocol and a privacy amplification step performed with extractors, which achieves (i) the best known bound of the two-way one round rate-limited WSK capacity in the case of degraded sources;
(ii) the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity (it extends [15] , in which degraded sources are assumed);
(iii) the two-way one round rate-limited SK capacity (no side information at the eavesdropper);
These results extend the bounds for a discrete source model in [3] , to the case of a continuous source model (the case of the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity is treated in [16] , but only for degraded sources);
• the proof that optimizing reconciliation and privacy amplification independently leads to the best possible key-distillation strategy for special cases, which is of prior importance to obtain a flexible coding scheme;
• the characterization of the rate-limited reconciliation capacity, which corresponds to the best tradeoff between the length of the sequence shared by Alice and Bob after reconciliation and the quantity of information publicly exchanged;
• the illustration of the results for binary and Gaussian degraded sources, for which reconciliation and privacy amplification can be designed independently in the case of a one-way rate-limited public communication. This includes the determination of a closed-form expression of the WSK capacity for binary symmetric sources.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we formally introduce the problem studied in the paper. In Section IV, we characterize the one round rate-limited reconciliation capacity, and we prove that the sequential application of reconciliation and privacy amplification with extractors is an optimal key-distillation strategy. We also provide scenarios for which these two phases can be designed independently of each other. Finally, in Section V, we illustrate our results in the cases of binary and Gaussian degraded sources for a one-way rate-limited communication. All proofs are gathered in the appendices to streamline presentation.
II. NOTATION
Consider p, q ∈ R. We define the following associative and commutative operation p q p(1 − q) + (1 − p)q; observe that [0, 1] is closed with respect to . We define the integer interval p, q , as the set of integers between p and q . We define [p] + as max(0, p). Finally, we note H b (·) the binary entropy, and (B c (K), ||.|| ∞ ) the set of K-bounded continuous function, where K ∈ R.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
As illustrated in Figure 1 , a source model for secret-key agreement represents a situation in which two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, and one eavesdropper, Eve, observe the realizations of a memoryless source (MS) (X YZ, p XY Z ), that can be either discrete (DMS) or continuous (CMS). The three components X, Y and Z, are observed by Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The MS is assumed to be outside the control of all parties, but its statistics are known. Alice and Bob's objective is to process their observations and agree on a key K, about which Eve should have no information. We assume a two-way one-round communication between Alice and Bob, that is, we suppose that Alice first sends a message to Bob, and that in return Bob sends a message to Alice. 3 We also assume that the messages are exchanged over an authenticated noiseless public channel with limited rate; in others words, Eve has total access to Alice and Bob's messages, but cannot tamper with the messages over the channel. We now formally define a key-distillation strategy.
Definition 1.
A (2 nR , n, R 1 , R 2 ) key-distillation strategy S n for a source model with MS (X YZ, p XY Z )
consists of
• a key alphabet K = 1, 2 nR ;
• two alphabets A, B respectively used by Alice and Bob to communicate over the public channel;
• two encoding functions f 0 : X n → A, g 0 : Y n × A → B;
• two functions κ a : X n × B → K, κ b : Y n × A → K;
and operates as follows
• Alice observes n realizations of the source X n while Bob observes Y n ; • Alice transmits A = f 0 (X n ) subject to H(A) nR 1 ;
• Bob transmits B = g 0 (Y n , A) subject to H(B) nR 2 ;
• Alice computes k = κ a (X n , B) while Bob computesk = κ b (Y n , A).
The performance of a (2 nR , n, R 1 , R 2 ) key-distillation strategy S n is measured in terms of the average probability of error between the key k generated by Alice and the keyk generated by Bob P e (S n )
, in terms of the information leakage to the eavesdropper L(S n ) I(K; Z n AB|S n ), and in terms of the uniformity of the key U(S n ) log 2 nR − H(K|S n ).
Definition 2.
A WSK rate R is achievable for a source model if there exists a sequence of (2 nR , n, R 1 , R 2 )
key-distillation strategies {S n } n 1 such that
Moreover, the WSK capacity of a source model with MS (X YZ, p XY Z ) is the supremum of achievable WSK rates.
In the following, we also consider situations in which the eavesdropper has access to the public messages exchanged by Alice and Bob, but has no side information Z n . In such cases, the WSK capacity is simply called the secret-key (SK) capacity and is denoted by C SK .
For convenience, we recall here known results regarding the model. (a) For R 1 , R 2 ∈ R + , the two-way one-round WSK capacity satisfies
where
(b) For R 1 ∈ R + , the one-way WSK capacity is
(a) For R 1 , R 2 ∈ R + , the two-way SK capacity is
rate constraints (1), (2) , and range constraints (3).
(b) For R 1 ∈ R + , the one-way SK capacity is
rate constraint (1), Markov condition (5), and range constraint (4).
For a DMS, in the absence of rate constraint between Alice and Bob, i.e. R 1 = +∞, [13, Theorem 4.7] (see also [9] ) states that we can handle reliability and secrecy successively to achieve the WSK capacity
, by means of a reconciliation step that deals with reliability, and a privacy amplification October 17, 2012 DRAFT 7 step that deals with secrecy. In the next sections, we extend these results for a rate-limited communication between Alice and Bob, i.e. R 1 , R 2 finite, and in addition, we study under which conditions secrecy and reliability can be treated as independent problems. Specifically, we study the achievability of
and C SK (R 1 , R 2 ) (Theorem 2) with a sequential key-distillation strategy consisting of a two-way one round reconciliation protocol and a privacy amplification with extractors.
IV. SEQUENTIAL KEY-DISTILLATION STRATEGY
In the following, we use the term sequential key-distillation strategy, for a key-distillation strategy consisting of the succession of a reconciliation protocol and a privacy amplification with extractors.
A. Reconciliation
During the reconciliation phase, Alice and Bob send messages to each other over an authenticated public channel with limited rate. Alice and Bob then process their observations to agree on a common bit sequence S. At this stage the sequence is not subject to any secrecy constraint. Formally, a two-way one round rate-limited reconciliation protocol is defined as follows.
convenience, for a source model with MS (X Y, p XY ) consists of
• an alphabet S = 1, M ;
• two encoding functions f : X n → A, g : Y n × A → B;
• two functions η a :
• Alice observes n realizations of the source X n while Bob observes Y n ;
• Alice transmits A = f (X n ) subject to H(A) nR 1 ;
• Bob transmits B = g(Y n , A) subject to H(B) nR 2 ;
• Alice computes S = η a (X n , B) while bob computesŜ = η b (Y n , A).
The reliability performance of a reconciliation protocol is measured in terms of the average probability of error P e (R n ) P[S =Ŝ|R n ]. In addition, since the reconciliation protocol, which generates the common sequence S, is followed by the privacy amplification step to generate a secret-key, it is desirable to leak as little information as possible over the public channel. As in [13] we define the reconciliation rate of a reconciliation protocol as R(R n )
Definition 4. For a given (R 1 , R 2 ), a reconciliation rate R is achievable, if there exists a sequence of rate-limited reconciliation protocols {R n } n 1 such that
Moreover, the two-way one round rate-limited reconciliation capacity
is the supremum of achievable reconciliation rates.
The reconciliation capacity characterizes the best trade-off between the length of the sequence shared by Alice and Bob after reconciliation and the quantity of information publicly exchanged. We formally prove in Section IV and Section V that in some cases, optimizing reconciliation and privacy amplification independently, which implies achieving the reconciliation capacity, leads to the best possible sequential key-distillation strategy.
(a) For R 1 , R 2 ∈ R + , the rate-limited reconciliation capacity
(b) Assume R 1 ∈ R + and R 2 = 0. For a DMS, we tighten the rate constraint (1) and the range constraint (4) as follows
For a CMS, (7) also holds, if the pdf f U |X exists and is in B c (K), for some K ∈ R.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 2. In Proposition 1, the equality in the rate constraint (7) relies on an argument applicable to various convex maximization problems: the maximum principle (see Appendix A-A). This argument is also used in Proposition 2.
Note that the refinement offered by these equalities is critical to tighten the range constraints on U in Propositions 1, 2, as well as to determine the WSK capacity for binary sources in Section V-A.
B. Privacy amplification
During the privacy amplification phase, Alice and Bob generate their secret key by applying a deterministic function, on which they publicly agreed ahead of time, to their common sequence S obtained after reconciliation. This phase is performed with extractors [17] , which are functions that take as input a sequence of n arbitrarily distributed bits and output a sequence of k nearly uniformly distributed bits, using another input of d truly uniformly distributed bits. The following theorem provides a lower bound on the size of the key, on which the legitimate users agree.
, [13] ). Let S ∈ {0, 1} n be the RV that represents the common sequence shared by Alice and Bob, and let E be the RV that represents the total knowledge about S available to Eve. Let e be a particular realization of E.
If Alice and Bob know that H ∞ (S|E = e) γn, for some γ ∈]0, 1[, then there exists an extractor 
are achievable with sequential key-distillation strategies.
Proof: See Appendix B-A.
Remark 4. Note that we assume X → Y → Z. Common examples for which this hypothesis is valid, are sources generated over the degraded broadcast channel, or over channels such that p XZ|Y = p X|Y p Z|Y , as in a wireless context for instance. For two-way communication, the necessity of this hypothesis might be an inherent weakness of a scheme that consists of a successive design of reconciliation and privacy amplification, rather than a joint design as in [3] (see the proof for more details). Observe, however, that for a one-way public communication (Theorem 5), this assumption is not required.
Proof: See Appendix B-B.
(a) For R 1 , R 2 ∈ R + , all SK rates R that satisfy
(b) Moreover, reconciliation and privacy amplification can be designed independently.
Proof: See Appendix B-C.
Theorem 5 and Theorem 4 state that a sequential key-distillation strategy achieves the best known bounds for the WSK capacity. Remark that, as demonstrated in Example 1, achieving the reconciliation capacity (Proposition 1), may not lead to an optimal sequential key-distillation, since the RV U that achieves C rec (R 1 , 0) (resp. the RVs U, V that achieve C rec (R 1 , R 2 )) in Proposition 1, might actually not achieve C WSK (R 1 , 0) (resp. R WSK (R 1 , R 2 )). In other words, reliability and secrecy can be handle successively, but cannot necessarily be treated as independent problems. 0 0 In contrast, Theorem 6 states much stronger conclusions regarding the SK capacity C SK , since reconciliation and privacy amplification can be designed independently of each other in all cases. Nevertheless, in the next section we prove that for the one-way WSK capacity, reconciliation and privacy amplification can be designed independently of each other for binary or Gaussian degraded sources. Example 1. Consider the scenario presented in Figure 2 , in which X and Y (resp. Y and Z) are connected by a Z-channel (resp. a mirrored Z-channel) with parameter p. Assume that R 1 H(X|Y ) so that
Hence, achieving the reconciliation capacity in a sequential key-distillation is not optimal here. However, this incurs a communication rate loss of 1 bit, as mentioned in Section IV-B.
V. SPECIAL CASES
In this section, we illustrate our results for a one-way rate-limited key-distillation with degraded sources, for which X, Y , and Z form a Markov chain. With this assumption, we refine the characterization of the WSK capacity and we study sequential key-distillation for binary and Gaussian sources; in these cases, we show that reconciliation and privacy amplification can be designed independently. We also briefly discuss the performance of vector quantization compared to scalar quantization in the Gaussian case. Fig. 3 . Example of the DMS studied in Section V-A capacity is
For a CMS, a similar result holds under the same condition as in Proposition 1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 6. The expression of the WSK capacity in Proposition 2 is obtained from Theorem 1.b and is due to Watanabe [16] . We refine this result by proving that equality holds in the rate constraint and by improving the range constraint of U; this refinement is critical for the analysis of binary sources, especially to solve the optimization problem for the WSK capacity in Proposition 3. distribution is not sufficient, nor necessary to obtain independent reconciliation and privacy amplification.
A. Binary source
As depicted in Figure 3 , assume that X has a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 1 2 , and that X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain. The alphabet X is binary, but no assumption is made on Y and Z. Proposition 3. Let R 1 ∈ R * + . If the channel p Y |X and p Z|X are symmetric [20] , then the auxiliary RV U achieving C WSK (R 1 , 0) in Proposition 2, is such that the test-channel p U |X is a BSC with parameter β 0 , with β 0 , any of the two symmetric solutions of
Proof: See Appendix D.
If the channel p Y |X and p Z|X are symmetric, then by Proposition 3, the auxiliary RV U achieving
Hence, by Propositions 1, 2 and Theorem 5, reconciliation and privacy amplification can be designed independently. Figure 4 , assume that X has a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 1 2 , and that X and Y (respectively Y and Z) are connected by a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability p (respectively q). By Proposition 3, the reconciliation capacity is
Example 2. As depicted in
and the WSK capacity is
with β 0 , any of the two symmetric solutions of the equation
Figure 6 (resp. Figure 5 ) shows that the reconciliation capacity C rec (R 1 , 0) (resp. the secret keycapacity C WSK (R 1 , 0)) is monotonically increasing in the communication rate constraint R 1 . As soon as R 1 is at least H(X|Y ), it attains the same maximum I(X; Y ) (resp. I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z)) as in the case and C WSK (R 1 , 0), so that reconciliation and privacy amplification can be designed independently. Consequently, for any other channel p Z|Y , as long as p Z|X stays symmetric, the reconciliation capacity and the optimal reconciliation protocol for sequential key-distillation remains the same. It is for instance the case if we choose p Z|Y as a binary erasure channel (BEC), as depicted in Figure 7 . Moreover, in this case, Proposition 3 still allows us to determine the WSK capacity:
where is the erasure probability characterizing p Z|Y .
B. Gaussian sources
Let X, Y , and Z be zero-mean correlated Gaussian sources on R. Assume that Alice, Bob, and Eve know the covariance matrix of (X, Y, Z). Proposition 4. The auxiliary RV U achieving C rec (R 1 , 0) in Proposition 1 is Gaussian. Moreover, the reconciliation capacity is
where ρ XY is the correlation coefficient between X and Y .
Proof: The result is deduced from Proposition 5 and Proposition 1.
Proposition 5 ([16]
). The auxiliary RV U achieving C WSK (R 1 , 0) in Proposition 2 is Gaussian. Moreover, the WSK capacity is
As illustrated in Figure 8 (resp. Figure 9 ) the reconciliation capacity (resp. the WSK capacity) does not reach I(X; Y ) (resp. I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z)) when R 1 exceed a certain value. As mentioned in [16] and Remark 1, unlike the case of discrete random variables, Since this equation has only one solution, we deduce by Propositions 1, 2 and Theorem 5 that for Gaussian sources, achieving the reconciliation capacity in a sequential key-distillation leads to an optimal keydistillation.
C. Practical considerations
The achievability scheme of Proposition 2 is based on Wyner-Ziv coding. For a practical implementation, additional structure needs to be introduced, for instance with vector quantization. Since scalar quantization is the simplest and often the most computationally efficient type of quantization, it is natural to ask how scalar quantization performs compared to vector quantization. We answer this question for the Gaussian case presented in Section V-B.
Proposition 6. Let n ∈ Z and ∆ > 0. Define U X Q a uniformly quantized version of X as follows:
If ∆ is small enough, then
where R 1 is the communication rate constraint, and α, β, K are some constants.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remark 8. The proof of Proposition 6 develops a technique that can be applied to other types of distributions (not necessarily Gaussian), as long as their pdfs exist and verify certain decreasing properties.
Proposition 6 gives a continuous counterpart of Remark 1. Indeed, if R 1 > h(X|Y ), then we can quantize X finely enough, and Proposition 6 states that I(Y ; U ) approaches I(X; Y ) exponentially fast as R 1 increases.
Hence, vector quantization does not offer significant improvement compared to scalar quantization, when the communication rate is above h(X|Y ). Note that, in practice we can optimize the scalar quantization, so that the loss could be even smaller than predicted by Proposition 6. Figure 10 illustrates this point by comparing the reconciliation capacity with numerical values of achievable rates obtained when X is scalar-quantized. 5 Nevertheless, for low communication rates, Figure 10 shows that vector quantization improves the performance; in this case, we could implement, for instance, trellis coded vector quantization (TCVQ) [21] . 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have extended the best known bounds of the WSK capacity for a discrete source model to the case of a continuous source model. For a discrete or continuous source model, we have proved that the best known bounds for the one-way WSK capacity with rate-limited public communication, are achievable by a sequential strategy that separates reliability and secrecy thanks to a reconciliation step followed by a privacy amplification step with extractors; in the case of two-way communication, the sequential design seems to suffer a loss of performance compared to the joint design and similar secret key rates were only established for degraded sources or when there is no side information at the eavesdropper (SK capacity). Moreover, we have demonstrated that reconciliation and privacy amplification can be designed independently for some scenarios, including the cases of binary and Gaussian degraded sources with one-way rate-limited public communication. A strength of sequential key-distillation is to easily translate into practical designs. Even more interestingly, the proposed scheme can be made very flexible with the following modifications.
1) Rate-compatible reconciliation: we can adapt to the characteristics of the legitimate users by the use of rate-compatible LDPC codes, to perform the reconciliation phase, as demonstrated in [22] , [23] . Note, however, that vector quantization might be required, which could complexify the reconciliation phase.
2) Rate-compatible privacy amplification: In Section IV-B, we have mentioned the possible use of hash functions, if we can afford a communication rate loss of 1 bit. In the latter case, we have access to privacy amplification methods easily adjustable to the characteristics of the eavesdropper's observations, if we make k vary in the following universal family of hash functions H = {GF(2 n ) → {0, 1} k , x → (k bits of the product xy)|y ∈ GF(2 n )}, where the k bits are fixed but their position can be chosen arbitrarily [24] .
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1

A. One-way communication
We first show the result for R 1 ∈ R + and R 2 = 0. The achievability and converse proof can be found in [15] , it remains to prove that equality holds in the rate constraint (1) and that |U| |X |.
1) Equality constraint:
We start with the following lemma.
We introduce the random variable Q ∈ {1, 2} independent of all others and set U = U Q . (a) Discrete case By Lemma 1, f (U ) and f 1 (U ) are convex in p U |X . Define ∆ {u ∈ R |U ||X | : ∀i, j ∈ 1, |U| × 1, |X | , |U | k=1 u kj = 1, u ij 0}, and C {u ∈ ∆ : f 1 (u) R p }. We first show that C is convex compact, with extreme points in {u ∈ ∆ : f 1 (u) = R p }:
• C is the preimage of [0, R p ] by the continuous function f 1 , thus C is closed. We deduce that C is compact, since C ⊂ [0, 1] |U ||X | and [0, 1] |U ||X | is compact.
• C is convex by convexity of f 1 , since the sublevels of a convex function are convex sets.
•
Since f is continuous, it reaches a maximum u max on the compact C. Then, since f is convex and C is a convex compact, by the Krein-Milman Theorem 6 , u max is a convex linear combination of extreme points of C (existence of such extreme points comes directly from the Krein-Milman theorem, since
. . , λ n 0 and u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n extreme points of C. By convexity of f ,
which means that there exists i ∈ 1, n s.t f (u max ) = f (u i ). We conclude that u max is an extreme point of C. This result is known as the maximum principle [25] .
(b) Continuous case
If the probability density functions (pdf) f U |X and f V |Y U exist and are in (B c (K), ||.|| ∞ ), the set of K-bounded continuous function, where K ∈ R, then we proceed as in the discrete case by using the theorem in [26] instead of Krein-Milman Theorem, since B c (K) has the positive binary intersection [27] .
2) Cardinality bound |U| |X |: This result is a special case of a more general one that we prove in Appendix C-B.
B. Two-way communication
Let R 1 , R 2 ∈ R + .
1) Converse:
We first establish the rate constraints on R 1 and R 2 . We have
where (a) holds by [28, Lemma 4.1], if we setŨ = X J−1 Y N J+1 J and J is a RV uniformly distributed on 1, n , independent of all previous RVs, (b) holds if we set U = AŨ , since X J andŨ are independent, and (c) holds since U → X J → Y J forms a Makov chain. Similarly, we have
where (d) holds because A is a function of X n and by Fano's inequality, since for any > 0, there exists a reconciliation protocol such that P(S =Ŝ) δ( ), 7 (e) holds since S = η a (X n , B), (f) holds 
We now determine the reconciliation capacity bound.
where (a) holds because the X i 's are i.i.d.. Then,
where (b) holds by (10) and since H(Ŝ|X n ) H(B|A) + nδ( ) by (9) , and (c) holds by (8) .
For a DMS, standard techniques [28] show that |U| |X |+2 and |V| |Y|.
2) Achievability: The proof for a DMS is similar to Wyner-Ziv coding [29] , we only describe the protocol. In the following, for n ∈ N and > 0, we note T n (X) the set of -letter-typical sequences [30] (also called "robustly typical sequence" in [31] ) with respect to p X . We also define conditional typical sets as follows, T n (Y |x n ) {y n : (x n , y n ) ∈ T n (XY )}. We note µ X min x∈supp(pX ) p X (x). Let > 0, and define 1 1 2 , 2 2 . Code construction: Fix a joint probability distribution p U X on U × X and p U V Y on U × V × Y.
u n (ω, ν) with (ω, ν) ∈ 1, 2 nR u × 1, 2 nR u , by generating the symbols u i (ω, ν) for i ∈ 1, n and
with (k, l) ∈ 1, 2 nR v × 1, 2 nR v , by generating the symbols v i (ω, ν, k, l) for i ∈ 1, n and (k, l) ∈ 1, 2 nR v × 1, 2 nR v independently according to p V |U =ui(ω,ν) .
Step1. At Alice's side: Given x n , find a pair (ω, ν) s.t (x n , u n (ω, ν)) ∈ T n (XU ). If we find several pairs, we choose the smallest one (by lexicographic order). If we fail we choose (ω, ν) = (1, 1). Define s n 1 u n (ω, ν) and transmit a n ω.
Step2. At Bob's side: Given y n and a n , findν s.t (y n , u n (ω,ν)) ∈ T n (Y U ) and defineŝ n 1 u n (ω,ν).
If there is one or more suchν, choose the lowest, otherwise setν = 1. Find a pair (k, l) such that
If there is one or more such (k, l), choose the lowest, otherwise set
If there is one or more suchl, choose the lowest, otherwise setl = 1. Define s n 2 v n (ω,ν, k,l) and
. We can show by standard arguments that there exists a code, such that after one repetition of the protocol, Alice obtains S n = U nV n , whereas Bob hasŜ n =Û n V n with
with probability approaching one for n large.
To extend the result to a CMS, we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 4.
APPENDIX B PROOFS FOR SECTION IV-C
A. Proof of Theorem 4
In the following, we use the same notations as in Appendix A.
1) Discrete case:
Let > 0. Let R 1 , R 2 ∈ R + . Let m, n ∈ N, and define N nm. Let k ∈ N to be determined later. Consider a sequential key-distillation strategy S N that consists of
• m repetitions of a reconciliation protocol R n based on Wyner-Ziv coding. One protocol operates as described in Appendix A-B. Hence, after one repetition of the protocol, P[Ŝ n = S n |R n ] P e ( , n). In addition, the information disclosed over the public channel during the m repetition of the reconciliation protocol is upper bounded by log|A| N + log|B| N = N I(U ; X|Y ) + N I(V ; Y |XU ) + N r 0 ( ), with lim →0 r 0 ( ) = 0; 10 8 δ (n) denotes a function of and n such that limn→∞ δ (n) = 0.
9 In Appendix F we show that Pe( , n) decreases exponentially to zero as n 2 goes to infinity.
• privacy amplification based on extractors, with output size k, at the end of which Alice computes her
The total information available to Eve after reconciliation consists of her observation Z N , the public messages A N and B N , respectively sent by Alice and Bob, and U d . The strategy S N is also known to
Eve, but we omit the conditioning on S N for convenience.
We first show that, for a suitable choice of the output size k, we have k
11 Then, we show that the corresponding WSK rate achieves the lower bound on the WSK capacity of Theorem 1. We first state Lemma 2, a refined version of the results in [9] , [13] , that is obtained by using the notion of robust typicality developed in the appendix of [31] , to later extend our result to the continuous case.
Lemma 2 ([9], [13], Refined version).
Consider a DMS (X Z, p XZ ) and define the RV Θ as
, where S X = {x ∈ X : p(x) > 0} and µ X = min x∈SX p(x) . Moreover, if z n ∈ T n (Z),
Let us start by defining the following RVs
By Lemma 2 applied to the DMS (U n V n Z n , p S n Z n ), P(Θ = 1) 1 − δ 0 (m), and by [9, Lemma 10],
To lower bound
to be able to use Theorem 3. By definition of Υ,
where (a) follows from Lemma 2, 12 and log(|A| N |B| N ) = N (I(U ; X|Y ) + I(V ; Y |XU )) + N r 0 ( ). We now lower bound H(S n |Z n ). We first remark that
where (a) is from Fano's inequality and (b) holds because V n is a function of (Y nÛ n ), the Y i 's and Z i 's are i.i.d.. We first lower bound H(Û n |Y n Z n ). Remark that
where (c) is from Fano's inequality, (d) holds because U n is a function of X n (U n is a quantized version of X n ), and (e) is true since the X i 's, Y i 's , and
where (f ) holds since P(∆ = 0) δ 2 (n), 13 and P(Γ = 0|∆ = 1) δ 4 (n)/2. 14 Indeed, we can apply Markov Lemma [32] (see the version given in [31] ), since we have U n → X n → Y n Z n and for every
Hence, combining (14), (15), and (16), we obtain
where 13 We have δ 2 (n) Pe( , n) by Wyner-Ziv coding in the reconciliation protocols.
14 By Markov Lemma, we have δ 4 (n) 2|SXY Z |e − We now lower bound the term −H(Y n |Z nŜn ) in (13) . Define
We can write
where (g) holds since P(∆ 1 = 0) δ 3 (n), 15 and
16 Indeed, we can apply Markov Lemma (see the version in [31] ), since we have V n → Y nÛ n → Z n and for every 15 We have δ 3 (n) Pe( , n) by Wyner-Ziv coding in the reconciliation protocols. 16 By Markov Lemma, we have δ
17 Note that the assumption of degraded sources is only necessary here. The use of this hypothesis is the weakness, at least for two-way communication (for one-way communication this assumption is not necessary), of a proof that consists of a successive design of reconciliation and privacy amplification, rather than a joint design as in [3] , where they exploit the joint design to get the joint typicality of (V n , Y n , U n , Z n ).
Hence by (19) , (20) ,
Combining (13), (17), (21),
Then, remark that
where (h) and (i) holds because conditioning reduces entropy. Hence, by (12) , (23) and (24) 
Set k to be less than the lower bound in (25) by
Now that we have lower bounded (27)), we can apply Theorem 3 to lower bound
, where δ * (N ) is defined in the theorem. Thus, we can finally lower bound
in (11):
where the equality is obtained thanks to the exponential decrease of δ * and δ 0 . Moreover, the leakage is such that
The keys computed by Alice and Bob are asymptotically the same as N goes to infinity, since
Then, by (18), (22), (26), we have that
Note that it is not exactly the bound proposed in Theorem 1.a for the WSK capacity. We finish the proof as follows. If I(V ; X|U ) I(V ; Z|U ), in the reconciliation we set R 2 = 0 so that we now have
Then, if I(U ; Y ) I(U ; Z), in the reconciliation protocol, we choose S n = V n (see the beginning of the proof), and we assume that U N is provided by a genie to Eve. Consequently, we obtain instead of Equation (12),
and conclude in the same manner, to obtain
2) Continuous case:
We use the following lemma to extend the result to the continuous case.
Lemma 3 ([33]
, [34] , [35] ). Let X and Y be two real-valued random variables with probability distribution P X and P Y respectively. Let E ∆1 = {E i } i∈I , F ∆2 = {F j } j∈J be two partitions of X and Y such that for any i ∈ I, P X (E i ) = ∆ 1 , for any j ∈ J , P Y (F j ) = ∆ 2 , where
be the quantized version of X, Y with respect to the partitions E ∆1 , F ∆2 respectively. Then, we have
Proof: We now use the general definition of mutual information given in [34] ,
LetẼ = {Ẽ 0 i } i∈I ,F = {F 0 j } j∈J be partition of X and Y such that they have for sub-partition E ∆1 , F ∆2 respectively. Then, we choose ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 small enough such that for any i ∈ I 0 , for any j ∈ J 0 ,
Then, for 1 small enough
Hence,
As in Lemma 3, from partitions of X, Y , U , V , and Z, we construct
Let us apply the proof of the discrete case to the random variables U ∆1 , V ∆1 , X ∆1 , Y ∆1 , and Z ∆2 . By Lemma 3 if we let ∆ 2 → 0, then Equation (27) becomes
then, by Lemma 3 we choose
At this point, we cannot conclude with the last inequality. Indeed, in the term r 3 ( , N ) are hidden the following terms: N H(X ∆1 |ZY ∆1 U ∆1 ) (see (18) ), N H(Y ∆1 |ZU ∆1 V ∆1 ) (see (22) ), N H(U ∆1 ) and N H(V ∆1 |U ∆1 ) (by definition of r 0 ( )), which do not go to 0 as N goes to infinity after normalization by N . Now, if we choose = n −a , where
Moreover, we still have a leakage verifying (28) , and Alice and Bob still share the same key K asymptotically, because in Equation (29), P e ( , n) exponentially decreases with n with the previous choice of .
B. Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5 is not directly deduced from Theorem 4. We first consider the case of one-way public communication, in which Alice sends messages to Bob, a first time with rate R 1 and a second time with rate R 2 . For this scenario we note C * rec the reconciliation capacity. We can modify the proof of Proposition 1 to obtain 19 the reconciliation capacity. For
Then, we can modify the proof of Theorem 4 to prove that 20 we can achieve the rate
subject to rate constraints (31), (32) and Markov conditions (33) , (34), by a reconciliation phase followed by a privacy amplification phase performed with extractors, and this time without the assumption X → Y → Z. Then, observe that 18 Recall that Pe( , n) decreases exponentially to zero as n 2 goes to infinity. subject to rate constraints I(U ; X) − I(U ; Y ) = R 1 = 0, (32) and Markov conditions (33) , (34) . Note that Markov condition
implies Markov conditions (33) and (34) and that if Markov condition (35) holds, then the rate constraint (32) becomes
subject to rate constraint R 2 I(X; V ) − I(Y ; V ) and Markov condition (35) . Hence, R * WSK (0, R 2 ) C W SK (R 2 , 0) by Theorem 1.b.
C. Proof of Theorem 6
The proof of Theorem 6 is the same as the one of Theorem 4 without the RV Z. We are able to show that reconciliation and privacy amplification can be treated independently because by Proposition 1, for
which means that the auxiliary RVs (U, V ) (resp. U ) maximizing C rec (R 1 , R 2 ) in Theorem 1 and
are the same. Hence, an optimal reconciliation leads to an optimal sequential key-distillation.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The proof is partially found in [16] and all that remains to be proved are the equality in the communication rate constraint and the range constraint |U| |X |.
A. Equality in the constraint
To prove that equality holds in the constraint for the argument of the maximum in Proposition 2, we can reuse the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A-A, so that we only need to show that f (U ) = I(Y ; U ) − I(Z; U ) is convex in p U |X . To obtain the convexity of f , we replace (X, Y ) by (Y, Z) in the function f 1 of Lemma 1.
B. Range constraint |U| |X |
The proof relies on a technique used in [36] .
Note that the capacity region C is from Proposition 2 and that the equality in the communication rate constraint is crucial to make it a subset of R. By [36, Lemma 3] ,
Consequently G(λ 1 , λ 2 ) is sufficient information to describe R. Then, we show that for all λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ R + , G(λ 1 , λ 2 ) can be achieved by considering a discrete random variable U such that |U| |X |.
Let λ 1 , λ 2 ∈ R + , let P in [36, Lemma 2] be the |X |-dimensional probability simplex, and let X =
. Consider P as a set of elements of the form of P , where
with u ∈ U. Then, each probability distribution on U defines a measure µ on P.
and H P (Z) as the entropies of X, Y , and Z respectively, when the distribution of X is P . Define
Let P * X achieve G(λ 1 , λ 2 ), and let µ * be such that P P µ * (dP ) = P * X . Denote by H * (X) the entropy of X under probability distribution P * X . Then, by [36, Lemma 2] , there exists P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P |X | , and
and,
From P * X (x j ), j ∈ 2, |X | , we can compute H * (X), H * (Y ), and
We have thus shown that we can choose U such that |U| |X | to achieve G(λ 1 , λ 2 ). Consequently, it is enough to consider U such that |U| |X |, to form the set R, as well as the set C, since C ⊂ R.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
If
the following. We note X = {0, 1} and by Proposition 2, we can assume U = {u 1 , u 2 }. We note
. We can write
with ∀y ∈ Y,
Moreover, since the channel p Y |X is symmetric, there exists a permutation π ∈ S |Y| such that
where ⊕ denotes the modulo 2 operation. Thus by (37) , (38) 
Similarly, by using that the channel p Z|X is symmetric, there exists g Z|X such that H(Z|U = u 1 ) = g Z|X (β 1 ) and H(Z|U = u 2 ) = g Z|X (β 2 ). Thus, we also have
Consider the region R 1 and R 2
We easily verify that both regions R 1 and R 2 are convex and that R 1 ⊂ R 2 . We will use a similar technique as in [37] , based on Lemma 4, to show that R 1 = R 2 . Then, thanks to the refinement proposed in Proposition 2 (equality in the constraint), we will be able to conclude
Lemma 4 ([37] [25] ). Let C ⊂ R d be convex. Let C 1 ⊂ C 2 be two bounded convex subsets of C, closed relative to C. If every supporting hyperplanes of C 2 intersects with C 1 , then
Let (R, R 1 ) ∈ R 2 , and let α ∈ [0, 1], then we have by (40), (41)
With the last inequality, we show that every supporting plane of R 2 intersects R 1 . Note that the weight coefficients of (R, R 1 ) have been taken of the form (α, 1 − α) with α ∈ [0, 1], because by positivity and convexity of R 2 , we only needed to consider hyperplanes (lines) with negative slope to apply Lemma 4.
Let (R 0 , R 0 1 ) be a boundary point of R 2 . There exists a supporting hyperplane H 0 at (R 0 , R 0 1 ) defined by (α 0 , 1 − α 0 ). By equation (42), there exists β * 0 ∈ [0, 1] such that
Let n ∈ Z. Let ∆ > 0. Define U , a scalar quantized version of X, as follows:
Then,
Observe that S U is a middle Riemann sum that approaches h(
we set f (x) −p X (x) log p X (x), we can show that for any a ∈ R + , 
Hence, for any a ∈ R + , if we take ∆ small enough, then log ∆
If we take a = σ x √ 2R 1 in (43), we obtain
To sum up, if R 1 is large enough, i.e R 1 > h(X|Y ), then ∆ can be chosen small enough to ensure log ∆ 2 +K 2 ∆ 2 , so that I(Y ; U ) approaches I(X; Y ) exponentially fast as R 1 increases.
APPENDIX F ERROR ANALYSIS OF THE RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we detail the error probability analysis for the reconciliation capacity in Proposition 1.
Although, the proof uses standard tools and is close to the work in [28] , [10] , we perform a finer analysis, and show the exponential decrease of P e ( , n) to zero as n 2 goes to infinity, which then allows us to extend our result to the case of a continuous source model.
In the following, we use the same notations as in Appendix A-B2. Define,
where indices with capital letters denote random variables.
We have
i ∈ 0, 6 by using the tools in [30] .
and (c) holds since U → X J → Y J forms a Makov chain. Similarly, we have
where (d) holds by Fano's inequality, since for any > 0, there exists a reconciliation protocol such that We now determine the reconciliation capacity bound.
where ( For a DMS, standard techniques [28] show that |U| |X |+2 and |V| |Y|.
B. Sequential key distillation 1) Discrete case: Let > 0. Let R 1 , R 2 ∈ R + . Let m, n ∈ N, and define N nm. Let k ∈ N to be determined later. Consider a sequential key-distillation strategy S N that consists of
• m repetitions of a reconciliation protocol R n based on Wyner-Ziv coding. After one repetition of the protocol, Alice obtains S n = (U n V n ), whereas Bob hasŜ n = (Û nV n ) with P[Û n =
U n ] δ (n), 24 P[V n = V n ] δ (n), P[Ŝ n = S n ] P e ( , n) 25 and (U n , V n , X n ), (Û n ,V n , Y n ), jointly typical with probability approaching one for n large. In addition, the information disclosed over the public channel during the m repetition of the reconciliation protocol is upper bounded by The total information available to Eve after reconciliation consists of her observation Z N , the public messages A N and B N sent by Alice, and U d . The strategy S N is also known to Eve, but we omit the conditioning on S N for convenience. 24 δ (n) denotes a function of and n such that limn→∞ δ (n) = 0.
We first show that, for a suitable choice of the output size k, we have k 
where (a) follows from Lemma 2, and log(|A| N |B| N ) = N (I(U ; X|Y ) + I(V ; X|Y U )) + N r 0 ( ). We now lower bound H(S n |Z n ). We first remark that
where (b) holds since U n and V n are functions of X n , and because the Y i 's and Z i 's are i.i.d..
We lower bound the term −H(X n |Z n S n ) in (49). Define 
The keys computed by Alice and Bob are almost the same as N goes to infinity, since
Then, by (53), (57), we have that r Then, if I(U ; Y ) I(U ; Z), in the reconciliation protocol, we choose S = V (see the beginning of the proof), and we assume that U N is provided by a genie to Eve. Consequently, we obtain instead of Equation (48), 
2) Continuous case:
We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 4 in Appendix B-A2.
